Litigation with a Foreign Flavor: A Comparison of the Warsaw Convention and the Hamburg Rules by Jarvis, Robert M. & Straubel, Michael S.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 4
1994
Litigation with a Foreign Flavor: A Comparison of
the Warsaw Convention and the Hamburg Rules
Robert M. Jarvis
Michael S. Straubel
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert M. Jarvis et al., Litigation with a Foreign Flavor: A Comparison of the Warsaw Convention and the Hamburg Rules, 59 J. Air L. &
Com. 907 (1994)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol59/iss4/4
LITIGATION WITH A FOREIGN FLAVOR: A
COMPARISON OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
AND THE HAMBURG RULES
Chaired by Robert M. Jarvis and Michael S. Straubel
EDITOR'S NOTE: From January 5-9, 1994, the Association of
American Law Schools held its Annual Meeting in Orlando, Flor-
ida. During the Meeting, the Section on Aviation and Space Law
joined the Section on Maritime Law in presenting a program that
compared the Warsaw Convention and the Hamburg Rules. Be-
cause of the importance of the issues discussed, the Journal of Air
Law and Commerce is pleased to publish below an edited version of
the program's transcript.
PROFESSOR ROBERT M. JARVIS (Nova Southeastern Uni-
versity): Good morning. As Chair of the Maritime Law
Section it is my pleasure to welcome you to this joint pro-
gram of the Aviation and Space Law and Maritime Law
sections. I believe that you will find this morning's pro-
gram to be both informative and provocative, and I en-
courage you to take issue with the panelists during the
question-and-answer period. It is now my pleasure to
turn over the microphone to Professor Michael S. Strau-
bel, the Chair of the Aviation and Space Law Section.
PROFESSOR MICHAEL S. STRAUBEL (Valparaiso Univer-
sity): Thank you, ProfessorJarvis. I have the honor today
of introducing our three panelists and telling you some-
thing about them. Our first speaker this morning is the
noted aviation lawyer Lee S. Kreindler. Mr. Kreindler re-
ceived his A.B. from Dartmouth College in 1945 and his
LL.B. from Harvard University in 1949. He is now the
senior partner in the New York City law firm of Kreindler
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& Kreindler. Mr. Kreindler frequently is called the dean
of American aviation lawyers, and with good reason. He
is a former chair of the Aviation Law Section of the Asso-
ciation of Trial Lawyers of America, a former chair of the
Aviation Litigation Committee of the Litigation Section of
the American Bar Association, a past president of the In-
ternational Academy of Trial Lawyers, and the author of
the seminal text Aviation Accident Law. Mr. Kreindler and
the members of his firm have played a leading role in just
about every major airline crash that has occurred in the
past forty years, and it was he who organized and led the
successful fight against the Montreal Protocols to the
Warsaw Convention. Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me
great pleasure to present to you Lee S. Kreindler.
MR. KREINDLER: Thank you, Professor Straubel. It is a
great pleasure to be here. This is my third opportunity to
address a meeting of this august Association and it is al-
ways a pleasure and an honor to do so.
My role today is to provide an overview of the Warsaw
Convention' and to indicate its shortcomings. That is not
very hard for me to do. The Warsaw Convention is an
abomination. It is an anachronism. It is an evil law. It
causes extraordinary distress to many people. It is abso-
lutely incredible that the United States of America in the
year 1994 is still a party to the Warsaw Convention and
we should get out of it. In my opinion, we should get out
of it completely. It should simply be renounced. A
number of alternatives and modifications have been sug-
gested to the Warsaw system, at least one of which, the so-
called Japanese initiative, has to be considered very seri-
ously. My position, however, is that the Convention is
very bad and the United States should renounce it.
Briefly stated, what does the Convention do? The War-
saw Convention applies to all international transportation
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.T.N.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1988) [hereinafter War-
saw Convention].
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by aircraft for hire. International transportation is specifi-
cally defined to include transportation between countries
that are parties to the Warsaw Convention or transporta-
tion that starts and ends in the same party country with an
agreed stopping place in some other country. For all
practical purposes, it applies to most international airline
transportation, although from time to time cases do arise
involving Turkey or one of the other countries that has
not adopted the Convention. It should be noted that at
the outset of any case one must look at the passenger
ticket to determine what the transportation is and how it
is defined because the ticket reflects the contract between
the airline and the passenger.
By its own terms, the Convention establishes a system
of presumptive liability. The Convention has been effec-
tively modified, however, by the Montreal Agreement of
1966.2
Article 17 of the Convention provides that the carrier is
liable in the event of an accident. Article 20 provides that
the carrier may exculpate itself by showing that it took all
necessary measures to avoid the damage. As a practical
matter, this is an impossibility. Article 22 limits the dam-
ages that the passenger or his or her family may recover.
On the checked baggage and goods side, the limitation on
the amount that the passenger may recover is given in
terms of French francs Poincar; for passenger injuries and
deaths it is 125,000 French francs Poincare', which converts
into approximately $10,000 per passenger. The limita-
tion can be waived by the carrier and also can be lost by
the carrier if there is proof of wilful misconduct. Essen-
tially, wilful misconduct means intentional conduct, in-
cluding reckless conduct with knowledge of the probable
consequences.
2 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302
(1966), reprinted in 2 THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AVIATION:
THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 19-49 to 19-50 (James R. Fox ed.
1992) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
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In 1966, the United States government, reacting to
Warsaw's terrible effect on victims of international acci-
dents, applied a great deal of pressure on the airlines.
This resulted in the Montreal Agreement.
As noted a moment ago, Article 22 of the Convention
contains a limitation provision and also states that the
limit can be increased by special contract between the pas-
senger and the carrier. Using the provisions of Article 22,
the Montreal Agreement raised the limit from $10,000 to
$75,000 and Article 20, the exculpatory clause, was
waived by the airlines up to that amount. The effect was
to establish absolute liability on the part of the carrier up
to $75,000. As a result, virtually all of the litigation that
has occurred since 1966 has centered around attempts by
plaintiffs to show wilful misconduct on the part of the car-
rier in order to defeat the $75,000 limitation. The Lock-
erbie case, in which a Pan Am airplane was blown up over
Scotland in December 1988, exemplifies recent litigation.
In Lockerbie, there were 225 passenger claims. They
were transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Lit-
igation to the Eastern District of New York and consoli-
dated before Chief Judge Thomas C. Platt, Jr. The case
subsequently was tried to a jury for three months and re-
sulted in a verdict of wilful misconduct. That verdict was
appealed by Pan Am or, more precisely, Pan Am's insur-
ance company, because in the interim Pan Am had en-
tered into bankruptcy. The appeal was argued on May 19,
1993, and we are still waiting for a decision from the Sec-
ond Circuit.' I, myself, am hopeful of prevailing. It
would not surprise me if the decision were by a divided
court,5 because the argument was the most animated I
3 See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, 709 F.
Supp. 231 (J.P.M.L. 1989), affid, 16 F.3d 513 (2d Cir. 1994).
4 Editor's Note: On January 31, 1994, the Second Circuit upheld the jury's ver-
dict. See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, 1994
WL 25773 (2d Cir. 1994).
Editor's Note: In fact, the panel was divided. While Judges Cardamone and
Altimari agreed that the verdict should be upheld, Judge Van Graafeiland voted to
reverse.
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have ever witnessed, let alone participated in. When peo-
ple ask me, "When are we going to know?", which about
ten clients ask me every day, I say "February 19th" be-
cause that will be nine months from the date of the oral
argument and that is the same as having a baby.
I have to tell you that I am ready for the case to be over.
It has been incredible, oppressive, exhausting litigation,
although intellectually rewarding and at times even fun.
If this case had involved a simple fault system or a sim-
ple negligence system, there would probably have been
no such litigation. But because one has to prove wilful
misconduct, the effort required has become enormous.
To give you an idea, I made twenty-five trips to Europe,
mostly to Frankfurt, Scotland, and London. There are
22,000 pages of depositions. The trial record is 8,000
pages long. Over 10,000 documents were marked as ex-
hibits. This is all because we had to prove wilful miscon-
duct in a situation where passengers have been killed.
Women and children have been waiting for what they are
entitled to for more than five years. That is utterly, utterly
incredible.
The Warsaw Convention, as presently applied with the
Montreal Agreement, is still a fault system-there is not
an automatic application of liability. Fault-in the form of
wilful misconduct in this case-must be established.
From a societal standpoint, it is my personal feeling that
it is very important to maintain the fault system. When
you fly to Europe today you will derive the benefit of the
Lockerbie litigation. The entire airline security apparatus
worldwide has been changed and improved, primarily be-
cause of the facts uncovered during discovery in the Lock-
erbie case. Incidentally, that gives my clients and me an
enormous feeling of pride.
The second aspect that gives us great satisfaction is the
fact that the civil litigation gave us the opportunity to
prove, in large part, how the bomb got on the airplane.
The trial provided the best evidence that the bomb came
in from Malta on Air Malta flight KM 180 from Malta to
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Frankfurt and was an interline transfer to Pan Am 103 in
Frankfurt. The evidence indicates it was an unaccompa-
nied bag. A week before the trial we took the testimony of
the detective in Scotland who had investigated the bits
and pieces of clothing that were found in the bomb bag
impregnated with explosives. The detective had taken the
fragments to Malta and gone from factory to factory and
proved that these bits and pieces of clothing had been
manufactured in Malta. He then traced the pieces to a re-
tail store and discovered that all of the clothing had been
sold to one of the two Libyans who has now been in-
dicted. This whole picture was really put together in the
civil case by finding the right witness, who had herself
produced the computer printout that showed the unac-
companied bag on Air Malta. It did not take me very long
to call the Lord Advocate of Scotland, who was the head
of the criminal investigation, and tell him who the witness
was and what she said. If the Libyans are ever brought to
justice they will be tried partly on proof that came out of
our civil litigation.
That is something to think about for a minute when we
talk about conventions that have automatic rules of liabil-
ity. This may not pertain to the cargo situation. When,
however, you are talking about human life and serious
personal injuries or death, as we are in the aviation con-
text, it seems to me that, somehow or other, there has got
to be preservation of the fault system. Although the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration does a good job, and the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board does a good job, and
the international authorities do a good job, they simply do
not do the whole job. Here it was the civil litigation that
helped establish how the bomb got on the airplane.
This takes me back to the Sabena crash of 1961.6 One
of the two ways to defeat limitation is by finding someone
else liable, such as the manufacturer. Sabena was a case
against Boeing that proved that there were defects in the
See Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aer-
ienne, 242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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707; as a result, these defects did not show up in the 747.
This is an area that affects me greatly and I do not want to
give up this protection, and that brings me to the Japa-
nese initiative.
An interesting modification in the Warsaw system has
been made unilaterally by the airlines of Japan. In 1966,
the Japanese airlines waived the limit up to $75,000.
Now, however, the Japanese government and the Japa-
nese airlines have waived the limit entirely. The Japanese
airlines have unilaterally decided that they will accept the
responsibility of absolute liability for any injury or death
that occurs in international travel on one of their airlines
and that they are not going to take advantage of any limi-
tation. If someone is killed on the way to Tokyo on Japan
Air Lines UAL), a very substantial settlement offer will be
made almost immediately because JAL has accepted,
under the Japanese initiative, the responsibility for abso-
lute liability with no limitation. On the other hand, if one
makes the mistake of flying on United Air Lines or North-
west Airlines and the same thing happens, it is probable
that the survivors will have to go through a Lockerbie-type
litigation experience.
The Japanese initiative is a wonderful thing for the pas-
senger in terms of compensation. I am often asked, "How
do you feel about the Japanese initiative?" In response, I
always have to make it clear that between what we have
now, with the possibility of extended litigation and hard-
ship for the families for a very long time, and absolute
unlimited liability, obviously absolute unlimited liability is
better. Thus, between the two, I favor the Japanese initia-
tive. Looking at the big picture, however, I am opposed
to the Japanese initiative because under it there is no op-
portunity to address the question of fault. If another Lock-
erbie case comes along and the Japanese initiative is in
place, the world will never know about the utterly outra-
geous conditions relating to airline security, or whatever
the next case involves. I think that is too high a price to
pay. I think the courts have to do both. They have to
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compensate but they also have to keep the airlines safe
and functioning properly. It is a hard choice when it
comes to the Japanese initiative.
Oddly enough, the other airlines of the world have not
climbed onboard. I thought as a competitive matter they
would have to do so, but so far they have not. The Japa-
nese say that it does not even cost them more in insurance
because the number of accidents in international airline
transportation is so low that the insurance cost is the same
whether there is or is not a limit. And yet, there seems to
be this reluctance to adopt it. I think, in fact, that if the
other airlines go along with the Japanese initiative, that
will be the end of my academic position and concern and I
do think that in that sense it will be a loss to society, which
now at least has some opportunity to find out what is go-
ing on.
Thank you very much for your attention. It has been a
pleasure to start the discussion and I look forward to
hearing the other speakers.
PROFESSOR STRAUBEL: Thank you, Mr. Kreindler. Our
next speaker is Professor Joseph C. Sweeney. Professor
Sweeney received his A.B. from Harvard University in
1954, his J.D. from Boston University in 1957, and his
LL.M. from Columbia University in 1963. Since 1966, he
has been on the faculty of the law school at Fordham Uni-
versity in New York City. Professor Sweeney will tell us
about the relatively new United Nations Convention on
the Carriage of Goods by Sea, more commonly known as
the Hamburg Rules. Professor Sweeney is particularly
well-qualified to discuss this subject as he was the United
States Representative to the Diplomatic Conference that
drafted the Rules.
PROFESSOR SWEENEY: Thank you, Professor Straubel,
and good morning to everyone. I shall be talking about
cargo damage and, in particular, whether the cargo owner
or the carrier bears the risk of loss. The Warsaw Conven-
tion deals with both passengers and cargo, but the
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Hamburg Rules7 deal only with cargo. Before I go on,
allow me to say just a word about the protection of pas-
sengers in maritime law.
As some of you may be aware, there exists an interna-
tional treaty dealing with passengers known as the Athens
Passenger Convention of 1974.8 It is extremely hostile to
United States interests concerning passengers on cruise
ships and I do not think that the United States will ever
become a party to the Athens Passenger Convention, es-
pecially since the Coast Guard is opposed to it. With that
much said, I turn now to the subject of cargo damage.
At the present time, there are fifteen conventions or
protocols to conventions dealing with the international
transport of cargo. 9 These go as far back as the 1924
Hague Rules and are as current as the 1991 Terminal Op-
7 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Official
Records, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 89/14 (1981), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 608 (1978)
and 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY Doc. No. 1-3 (Michael F. Sturley ed. rev. 7th ed.
1993) [hereinafter Hamburg Rules]. The United States is a signatory to the Con-
vention but has not yet ratified it. The Convention entered into force on Novem-
ber 1, 1992.
a International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, Athens, Dec. 13, 1974, reprinted
in 14 I.L.M. 945 (1975) and BENEDICT, supra note 7, at Doc. No. 2-2. The 1974
Convention replaces the 1961 Carriage of Passengers by Sea and the 1967 Car-
riage of Passenger Luggage by Sea.
9 (a) The Hague Rules: International Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Brussels, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S.
155, T.S. No. 931, 51 Stat. 233. The United States and twenty-five other nations
attended the Diplomatic Conference. United States ratification was proclaimed
on May 25, 1937, and codified at 49 Stat. 1207 and 51 Stat. 260 (1937). The
treaty had entered into force in 1931 with the ratification of Belgium, Hungary,
Spain, and the United Kingdom.
(b) The Warsaw Convention: Twenty-two nations attended the Diplomatic Con-
ference, not including the United States, which merely sent an observer. The
treaty entered into force on February 13, 1933 with seven ratifications: Brazil,
France, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Yugoslavia. The advice and consent
of the United States Senate was obtained without debate or recorded vote on June
15, 1934 (78 Cong. Rec. 11,587) and the President proclaimed the ratification
effective on June 27, 1934 (49 Stat. 3013). See supra note 1.
(c) C.IM. or Rail Convention: International Convention Concerning the Car-
riage of Goods by Rail, Berne, Oct. 25, 1952, 241 U.N.T.S. 336. This is a revision
of an earlier European convention and the United States is not a party.
(d) Hague Protocol: Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, The Hague, Sept. 28,
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erators Liability Convention. Nine of the fifteen are now
in force. The format for many of them actually was
worked out by a group of lawyers interested in air law. I
am, of course, referring to the Comite International Tech-
nique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens (CITEJA), the group
1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol]. The United States is not a
party.
(e) C.M.R. or Road Convention: Convention on the Contract for the Interna-
tional Carriage of Goods by Road, Geneva, May 19, 1956, 339 U.N.T.S. 190. The
United States is not a party.
(f) International Convention Relating to the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships:
Brussels, May 25, 1962, reprinted in BENEDICT, supra note 7, at Doc. No. 5-5. Not in
force.
(g) Visby Protocol: Protocol to Amend the 1924 International Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Brussels, Feb.
23, 1968, 2 U.N. Register of Texts ch. 2, at 180, reprinted in BENEDICT, supra note 7,
at Doc. No. 1-2. These amendments entered into force on June 23, 1977. The
United States is not a party.
(h) Guatemala Protocol: Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Guatemala City, Mar.
8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932. Not yet in force.
(i) 1975 Montreal Protocols: Additional Protocols 1-4 to Amend the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air,
Montreal, Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Docs. 9145-9148. Not in force. The United
States Senate held hearings on these Protocols in 1977, 1981, and 1983.
Although the Senate approved the Protocols on March 19, 1983, by a vote of 50
to 42, the Protocols did not come into effect because the required two-thirds ma-
jority was not obtained.
(j) Hamburg Rules: United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by
Sea, Hamburg, Mar. 31, 1978. See supra note 7.
(k) S.D.R. Protocol: Further Protocol to Amend the 1924 International Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading,
Brussels, Dec. 21, 1979, reprinted in BENEDICT, supra note 7, at Doc. No. 1-2A. This
protocol entered into force on February 14, 1984. The United States is not a
party.
(1) Multimodal Convention: 1980 United Nations Convention on International
Multimodal Transport of Goods, Geneva, May 24, 1980, U.N. Doc. TD/MT/
Conf./16, reprinted in BENEDICT, supra note 7, at Doc. No. 1-4. Not yet in force.
The United States is not a party.
(m) COTIF 1980: International Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Rail,
Berne, May 9, 1980, Cmnd. 8535.
(n) 1989 Inter-American Road Convention: Organization of American States,
1989 Inter-American Convention on International Carriage of Goods by Road,
reprinted in 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 121 (1989).
(o) 1991 0.T.T. Convention: United Nations Convention on the Liability of
Terminal Operators in International Trade, Vienna, Apr. 19, 1991, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 152/13, reprinted in 14 FORDHAM Irr'L LJ. 1115 (1991) [hereinafter OTT
Convention]. Not yet in force. There currently are five signatories: Italy, Mexico,
the Philippines, Spain, and the United States.
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that did the groundwork for the Warsaw Convention. Its
work, which was totally theoretical at the time since there
was no international aviation transport industry, has been
followed in international transport conventions ever
since.
CITEJA laid out ten basic provisions for transport con-
ventions, and as you look through the Warsaw Conven-
tion and compare modern conventions to it you can see
how well CITEJA did its work.
The first provision deals with definitions of terms. The
civil law lawyers generally are not fond of these. They re-
gard these definitions as unnecessary and harmful. From
a common law viewpoint, they also are very dangerous be-
cause they are the places where you drop in all the little
bits of policy that you wish to conceal from the readers of
the Convention's general provisions. The other provi-
sions are: 2) the geographic and documentary scope of
the convention; 3) the period of carrier responsibility
(that is, from when to when); 4) the basis of the carrier's
liability (they are all essentially fault-based); 5) the limita-
tion of the carrier's liability in money; 6) the loss of the
carrier's right to limit (called breakability); 7) the liability
of the shipper who ships dangerous goods; 8) the issue of
a document and its contents; 9) the time bar on claims;
and, 10) the jurisdiction of the courts.
A general observation about both the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Hamburg Rules is in order here. The
Hamburg Rules follow an earlier convention, the Hague
Rules of 1924, which was the first international conven-
tion dealing with the allocation of risk of loss in cargo
damage. That treaty was produced by an ancient world-
wide industry with many common practices, and while
there were theoretical differences between French law,
Scandinavian law, American law, and English law, there
were many common practices in what was a well-known
industry. When the Warsaw Convention was prepared in
1929, however, there was not an international aviation in-
dustry. Warsaw was seen as necessary to protect the in-
918 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
fant industry itself, not just the insurers, as was the case
with the Hague Rules.
The colonial empires realized the need for rapid com-
munication with their outlying colonies and spurred the
development of British Imperial Airways, Air France,
KLM, Sabena, and Alitalia in the 1920s to connect their
colonial outposts. Many of these operations were not in-
ternational as such and stopped only at colonial posses-
sions. London to Paris in 1920, and Key West to Havana
in 1927, were the first truly international routes by air-
craft, and transatlantic service by lighter-than-air craft was
begun in 1928 from Germany to New Jersey by the
Zeppelin Company. Thus, by the time of the Second
World War, there was an international aviation industry
to which the Warsaw Convention could be applied.
I have been fortunate to have the opportunity to ob-
serve at very close hand the making of a number of these
conventions since 1970. Of the fifteen transport conven-
tions that I have spoken of, the United Nations General
Assembly and its subsidiary organs, UNCITRAL l ° and
UNCTAD, t" have worked on four of them.
There are specialized agencies dealing separately with
these transport modes: the ICAO' 2 at Montreal for the
10 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
was established in 1966. See G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI of Dec. 17, 1966, 1 UNCITRAL
Y.B. 65). Composed of thirty-six nations, its headquarters is in Vienna. In addi-
tion to its work on the Hamburg Rules and the OTT Convention, UNCITRAL has
produced the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 19
I.L.M. 668 (1980); the United Nations Convention on International Bills of Ex-
change and International Promissory Notes (adopted by the General Assembly,
see G.A. Res. 43/165, in 1988 in lieu of a diplomatic conference); and the Volun-
tary Arbitration Rules of 1976.
1 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was
established in 1964 by G.A. Res. 1995 (XIX), 19 UNGAOR, Supp. No. 15 at 1. All
members of the United Nations participate. Conferences are held at four-year
intervals at differing locations, while the headquarters is in Geneva. Its transport
conventions include the 1974 Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 13 I.L.M.
912 (1974) (in force 1980); the 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention, see supra
note 9(1); and the 1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registra-
tion of Ships, 26 I.L.M. 1229 (1987) (not yet in force).
12 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was created by the
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aviation industry and the IMO' 3 at London for the mari-
time industry. But these specialized agencies do not nor-
mally deal with the liability and business aspects of
international transport. The General Assembly, however,
through UNCITRAL and UNCTAD, has been concerned
with the allocation of risks of transport.
UNCITRAL is responsible for the preparation of legal
texts on trade law issues and the special work of UNCI-
TRAL is putting the science of comparative law into ac-
tion. I have observed this science in action at UNCITRAL
in its work on both the Hamburg Rules and the Terminal
Operators Liability Convention. UNCITRAL endeavors,
through its comparative law work, to take account of the
world's legal systems and also to give some consideration
to the differences between Western economies, state so-
cialism, and centrally-planned economies (the United Na-
tions' euphemism for the Soviet Union before it
collapsed).
UNCITRAL's Working Group prepared the Hamburg
Rules at six sessions that lasted from 1971 to 1976. UN-
CITRAL then forwarded a draft text to the General As-
sembly. The General Assembly's Sixth Committee
reviewed it and then sent it to a diplomatic conference at
Hamburg in March 1978. It was a seven-year effort of
study, research, and bargaining.
The Terminal Operators Liability Convention deals not
just with maritime transportation but with air and other
modes of transportation and the liability of the terminal
operator as goods are moved at the terminal from one
mode of transport to another. That work began in
UNIDROIT14 but UNCITRAL took it over in 1984. The
1944 Chicago Convention and was established at Montreal in 1946. See 61 Stat.
1180 (1944).
13 The International Maritime Organization (IMO), known as the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) from 1958 until 1982, was
established at London in 1958 under its 1948 Constitutive Charter. See 9 U.S.T.
621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 298 U.N.T.S. 48.
14 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
was chartered under the League of Nations in 1926. It is headquartered in Rome.
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Working Group prepared the draft over five years, and in
1989 the UNCITRAL Plenary Commission forwarded the
draft to the General Assembly, which called a diplomatic
conference at Vienna in April 1991.
Both of these UNCITRAL texts were worked on for
seven-year periods. They were not done in haste. There
have been no transport projects in the United Nations
since the collapse of Soviet Communism, and I do not
know what the effect will be in the future drafting of these
agreements given that one no longer has to take into ac-
count the special needs of centrally-planned economies.
At least as far as I can tell, the delegates of the People's
Republic of China have not insisted on points of commu-
nist ideology.
How did the Warsaw Convention affect the Hamburg
Rules? Many of the people drafting the Hamburg Rules
were familiar generally with the Warsaw Convention. The
Secretariat in 1972 had prepared a report that suggested
that carrier liability be framed in language similar to that
used in the European Rail Convention. 15 The problem
with this idea was that the Rail Convention was unclear as
to the burden of proof: who had a positive case and who
had to prove the defenses? The Egyptian delegate there-
fore made the suggestion to reject the Rail Convention
analogy and look to the Warsaw Convention, which pro-
vides that the carrier is liable for loss or damage to the
goods unless the carrier proves that it, or its servants or
agents, had taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage and its consequences. 16 This is a reverse burden
of proof in tort law and it is what the Hamburg Rules now
provide. 17 It is not exactly the same language but it is
15 See supra notes 9(c), (m).
16 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(1) ("The carrier shall not be liable
if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures.").
17 Hamburg Rules, supra note 7, art. 5(1) ("The carrier is liable... if the occur-
rence which caused the loss ... took place while the goods were in his charge ...
unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that
could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.").
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very close.
A second instance of Warsaw influence was the ques-
tion of the denial of the unit limitation, what we call the
breakability of the carrier's right to unit limitation because
of serious faults. There were proposals to deny unit limi-
tation because of the intentional conduct of the carrier,
the intentional conduct of the carrier's servants, the reck-
lessness of the carrier's servants, or, lastly, the wilful mis-
conduct of the carrier's servants.' 8 A full debate went on,
and after considering the United States case law, the
French case law, and the English case law on wilful mis-
conduct, the view prevailed that we could not repeat that
mistake in maritime law. As a result, Article 8 of the
Hamburg Rules practically eliminates breakability. 19
A third instance of Warsaw influence occurred in the
provision for penalizing invalid clauses in bills of lading.
Again, the Warsaw experience was not helpful.20  There
was a lengthy debate on the sanctions to be imposed for
using invalid clauses but, after a discussion of the Warsaw
sanctions, we decided to stick with the provision in the
Hague Rules that an invalid clause has no effect in
litigation.2 '
The Hamburg Rules must be read as a reaction to the
1924 Hague Rules. The United States Carriage of Goods
18 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1) ("The carrier shall not be enti-
tled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct .. ").
19 Hamburg Rules, supra note 7, art. 8(1) ("The carrier is not entitled to the
benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in article 6 if it is proved that the
loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an act or omission of the carrier
done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay, or recklessly and with
knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably result."). Similar lan-
guage applies to the servants and agents of the carrier. See art. 8(2).
20 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 32 ("Any clause contained in the con-
tract and all special agreements entered into before the damage occurred by
which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by this convention,
whether by deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the rules as to jurisdic-
tion, shall be null and void .... ).
21 Hague Rules, supra note 9(a), art. 111(8) ("Any clause, covenant or agreement
in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or
damage to or in connection with the goods . . . or lessening such liability other-
wise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect .... ).
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by Sea Act (COGSA)22 is the most heavily litigated statute
in transport law in the United States, even after nearly
sixty years. It is therefore impossible to argue that all of
its problems have been resolved. The Hamburg Rules
were written in the context of finding solutions to the
most pressing problems, with the hope that the unfairness
perceived by developing states would be alleviated. The
Hague Rules were successful in dealing with a number of
problems in maritime law from the days of sail and from
the experience of World War I. The core of the Hague
Rules - namely, the amount of limitation of liability per
unit - rapidly deteriorated, so that it is impossible today
for insurers to predict the exact amount of exposure that
they will have as a result of a disaster. The Hague Rules
provide a unit of limitation of liability of one hundred
pounds sterling in gold per package." The United States
translated that into United States dollars in 1936 as $500
per package for goods that are packageable 4 Congress
has left the amount at $500 per package ever since, de-
spite the effects of inflation.
Another problem with COGSA is its very narrow docu-
mentary scope: it only covers paper bills of lading. 5 The
geographic scope is also very narrow: it only covers the
ocean voyage. 6 Thus, COGSA does not address the
before-voyage and after-voyage problems when the car-
rier is in actual control of the goods.
Clauses for law selection or forum selection preprinted
on the bill of lading also can be hostile to United States
cargo interests.27 So, as can be seen, there were problems
22 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988). COGSA was enacted in 1936 prior to
United States ratification of the Hague Rules, and made subject to reservations
(or understandings) promulgated in 1937.
22 Hague Rules, supra note 9(a), arts. IV(5) and X.
24 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) (1988).
25 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300, 1301(b) (1988).
26 46 U.S.C. app. § 1301(e) (1988) ("The term 'carriage of goods' covers the
period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are
discharged from the ship." This is often referred to as the "tackle to tackle"
rule.).
27 See Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967); Hughes
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with the Hague Rules that required a major overhaul in
1978. The Hamburg Rules were the product of seven
years of comparative law research, hard bargaining, and
compromise. The rules preserve a fault system of liabil-
ity. It is a modern, sophisticated convention dealing in
one document with most of the problems of the relation-
ship between the cargo owner and the carrier.
The problem of the unit limitation is always extremely
difficult. The International Monetary Fund's Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) system has been used to set the
unit limitation of liability at 2§ SDR's per kilogram or 835
SDR's per package, whichever is greater. 28 The Hamburg
Rules also contain a solution to the delayed damage prob-
lem. Physical deterioration is governed by the general
rule of 2§ SDR's per kilogram or 835 SDR's per package,
while economic loss, where provable, is governed by a
special limit of 2§ times the freight.2 9
I am not saying that everything is perfect in the
Hamburg Rules. The delegates did try to deal with the
problems that had arisen in the decades following the
adoption of the Hague Rules, but they were unwilling to
deal with the related difficulties of financing and docu-
menting international trade. They did not want to hear
about non-traditional documents or electronic data in-
terchange systems.3 0
The Hamburg Rules also do away with two obsolete
Drilling Fluids v. M/V Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1033 (1989).
28 Hamburg Rules, supra notes 7, art. 6(1), (2).
29 Id. art. 6(1)(b).
so Id. arts. 14, 15, and 16. Article 14(3) provides that "[t]he signature on the
bill of lading may be in handwriting, printed in facsimile, perforated, stamped, in
symbols, or made by any other mechanical or electronic means, if not inconsistent
with the law of the country where the bill of lading is issued." Cf. OTT Conven-
tion, supra note 9(o), art. 4(3). The OTT Convention states that "[a] document
... may be issued in any form which preserves a record of the information con-
tained therein. When the customer and the operator have agreed to communicate
electronically, a document ... may be replaced by an equivalent electronic data
interchange message." Id. Article 4(4) adds that "[t]he signature ... means a
handwritten signature, its facsimile or an equivalent authentication effected by any
other means." Id.
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doctrines: the concept of carrier unseaworthiness s' and
the defense of negligent navigation.3 2 The Warsaw Con-
vention used to have a defense of negligent navigation to
cargo damage, but the Hague Protocol of 1955 got rid of
it as far as signatories to the protocol are concerned."
We now have in the Hamburg system a reverse burden of
proof: the presumption that the carrier is liable for dam-
age unless the carrier proves that it did all things reason-
ably possible to prevent the damage and its
consequences.3 4  The Hamburg Rules also have much
clearer provisions with respect to the jurisdiction of the
courts.3 5 The Hamburg Rules apply to both import and
export transactions. This, of course, is nothing new for
the United States because the Harter Act of 189336 and
COGSA3 7 apply to import and export. For the rest of the
world, however, this is a dramatic change because the
Hague Rules apply only outward, not inward.
The Hamburg Rules came into force on November 1,
1992, and there are now twenty-two signatories to the
Rules. 38 The United States is in a stalemate with regard to
SI Article III(l) of the Hague Rules states that "[tihe carrier shall be bound,
before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to (a) make
the ship seaworthy." See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1301(1) (1988). In addition, Article
IV(l) provides that "[n]either the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or
damage arising or resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due
diligence on the part of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy." See 46 U.S.C.
app. § 1304(1) (1988).
52 Article IV(2) of the Hague Rules states that "[n]either the carrier nor the ship
shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from [the] act, neglect,
or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the naviga-
tion or in the management of the ship." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(2) (1988). See also
46 U.S.C. app. § 192 (1988).
3 "Paragraph 2 of Article 20 of the Convention shall be deleted." Hague Pro-
tocol, supra note 9(d), art. X.
34 Hamburg Rules, supra note 7, art. 5(1).
35 Id. art. 21(1).
36 See 46 U.S.C. app. § 192 (1988); Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, 179 U.S. 69
(1900).
37 See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1312 (1988).
38 The signatories are: Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Chile, Egypt, Guinea, Hungary, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Ni-
geria, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Republic of
Tanzania, and Zambia.
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ratification of the Rules, and the issue has not moved in
the United States for years. The State Department will
not forward the proposal to the President for presentation
to the Senate until the industry is in agreement, yet the
industry is light-years away from agreeing on the alloca-
tion of risks between shipowners and their insurers on the
one hand and cargo owners and their insurers on the
other hand. I do not expect United States ratification very
soon, but it was an exciting adventure for me to spend
more than eight years of my life working on the project,
trying to make the law better. I think we did that and, for
that reason, I commend the Hamburg Rules to you for
your study and support.
PROFESSOR STRAUBEL: Thank you, Professor Sweeney.
Our final speaker this morning is Professor Carl E.B.
McKenry. Professor McKenry holds an A.B. (1949), aJ.D.
(1954), and an LL.M. (1962) from the University of Miami
and an LL.M. (1965) from New York University. From
1948 to 1957 Professor McKenry worked for Pan Ameri-
can World Airways. He then joined the University of
Miami's School of Business Administration. Today, he
holds appointments in the University's business, law, and
international studies schools. Professor McKenry will
compare and contrast the two regimes of which Mr. Krei-
ndler and Professor Sweeney have just spoken.
PROFESSOR McKENRY: Thank you, Professor Straubel.
My assigned task is to compare the Warsaw Convention
with the Hamburg Rules from an "academic" standpoint.
While the traditional approach might be to emphasize the
similarities, here a comparison of the differences is more
appropriate. Permit me to open with a short personal
note by way of illustration.
As a young lawyer, my senior boss (once removed) in
the legal department of Pan American was Henry J.
Friendly. He was both Pan Am's Vice President and Gen-
eral Counsel as well as a name partner in what was then
the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly, Hamilton &
Ball. As you all know, he later served with great distinc-
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tion on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
Perhaps because he was a pioneer in the subject's form-
ative years, Judge Friendly argued that the concept of air
law as a discrete or generic legal area did not really exist.
In fact, he felt so strongly that he devoted his entire re-
view39 of the text Air Law, by Professor DeForest Billyou,
to the argument that aviation law was really nothing more
than a fragmented collection of previously established
topics, such as administrative law, constitutional law, con-
tracts, international law, property, and torts. Judge
Friendly, however, neither harbored nor articulated such
a position in regard to admiralty or maritime law. Thus,
my point of beginning in comparing the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Hamburg Rules is to suggest that while cer-
tain similarities exist in the English-language versions of
these two multilateral treaties, in the application and in-
terpretation of the Hamburg Rules (as well as Hague-
Visby) there is the evolution of centuries of highly special-
ized jurisprudence. The Warsaw Convention, in contrast,
is a creature of the twentieth century, as is aviation itself.
Professor Sweeney suggested that whenever we try to
compare the two regimes, we have the distinction that in
maritime or admiralty law there are centuries of very spe-
cific jurisprudence that serve as a reservoir to call upon.
In air law, we have no such reservoir, and even in the
interpretation of cases with similar facts, we find a sub-
stantial difference because of this historical imbalance.
The fundamental distinction is enlarged, in part, I sus-
pect, because of the dual nature of aviation as both a land
and sea transport mode. In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
City of Cleveland,40 the United States Supreme Court, per-
haps because it could not accept an earlier court of ap-
peals ruling that an aircraft clearly visible from the
runways of Logan Field and resting in the marshes edging
Boston harbor was in navigable water and hence admi-
s9 See HenryJ. Friendly, Book Review, 77 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1964).
40 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
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ralty jurisdiction, 4' used the case of a land-based aircraft
sliding off a Cleveland runway into the waters of Lake Erie
to require a maritime flavor or "nexus" in the absence of
a federal statute in order to establish admiralty jurisdic-
tion. This created the interesting situation where an avia-
tion-related accident under the Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA)4 2 would give admiralty jurisdiction by stat-
ute, while in the absence of a "maritime nexus" surviving
passengers on the same flight would probably be under
federal common law and thus be entitled to a jury trial
and possibly other advantages.
Aircraft flying from Miami to, say, for example, New
York or Boston, often are routed 300 miles out to sea.
Because of a footnote in Executive Jet,43 DOHSA, which is
an admiralty statute, would apply to any death claims but
not to any survivor claims that lacked a maritime nexus.
Of course, federal courts have found a way around this
apparent inequity in Warsaw Convention cases by recog-
nizing that the treaty creates its own cause of action and
permitting a jury trial irrespective of DOHSA.
From the United States position, another significant
distinction has been the applicable national language. Be-
cause the Hague Rules, with some modifications, have
been incorporated into COGSA, a United States statute,
the English language as stated therein is the legislation
before a court. However, the Warsaw Convention was
ratified in its original French language by the United
States Congress, thereby creating, in some instances, a
double layer for court interpretation. I say that it is a
double layer of difficulty because the French text must be
translated both into literal and legal English. This diffi-
culty is not present with the maritime treaties.
The double layer problem is quite obvious in any War-
saw Article 25 consideration. Essentially, we take what is
41 See Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 940 (1963).
42 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988).
43 409 U.S. at 271 n.20.
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a civil law concept, "dol" in French, which has sugges-
tions almost of felonious intent, and through skillful advo-
cacy, jury trials, and the like, we have pretty well watered
it down to a standard something around gross negligence
or maybe just slightly less. That has been one of the ma-
jor problems with the Warsaw Convention, as has already
been touched upon by the previous speakers.
A final significant distinction is the emphasis in Warsaw-
based litigation (both in terms of the volume of cases and
amounts in controversy), particularly in the United States,
toward wrongful death and personal injury claims.
Although the Warsaw Convention covers both passengers
and cargo, while Hamburg, of course, is concerned solely
with cargo, there has been a preoccupation under Warsaw
with personal injury and death cases. This preoccupation
has created a "spillover" effect in some areas of equal ap-
plicability to provide a different and more liberal outcome
in some cargo cases than might otherwise have obtained
with a cargo loss in a purely shipping environment be-
cause of the practice of having passenger cases serve as
precedent.
In contrast, there are some interesting and obvious sim-
ilarities between the two regimes:
(1) Both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Rules are creatures of European conferences held in the
1920s.
(2) Both were revised primarily due to their low liabil-
ity limits. Revision of the Warsaw Convention came
through the promulgation of the Hague Protocol of 1955
while change to the Hague Rules came about in the form
of the Visby Amendments of 1968.
(3) As we speak, both are confronted with suggested
new provisions: the Hamburg Rules in the maritime field
and what are referred to as Montreal Protocols 3 and 4 in
the aviation field.
A point of clarification is in order here. The Montreal
Protocols are actually changes to the Warsaw Convention,
as is the Hague Protocol. The Montreal Agreement re-
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ferred to by Mr. Kreindler, which raised the limit of liabil-
ity to $75,000 where the aircraft moves into, out of, or has
an agreed stopping place in the United States, is nothing
more than a shotgun agreement between the United
States government and the air carriers using the Warsaw
provision that the passenger and the carrier can agree to a
higher liability limit.
There are certain similarities of language that might re-
sult in future efforts by courts and/or advocates to rely on
Warsaw-interpretation precedents in analyzing Hamburg-
based cases. Because of our time restrictions this morn-
ing, I will discuss only two areas: liability limitation and
jurisdiction.
LIABILITY LIMITATION
At the heart of liability limitation is the bill of lading (in
the case of maritime shipments) and the airway bill (in the
case of aviation shipments). Articles 5 through 16 of the
Warsaw Convention deal with the airway bill. Changes in
the Hague Protocol are minimal in regard to cargo. How-
ever, in Montreal Protocol Number 4, Articles 5 to 16 of
original Warsaw are deleted and replaced. On the mari-
time side, Hamburg Articles 14 to 17 establish bill of lad-
ing requirements while non-bill of lading documents are
covered in Article 18. Both Hamburg and Montreal Pro-
tocol Number 4 generally provide additional flexibility,
but a detailed comparison exceeds our present
consideration.
In regard to carrier liability, Articles 3(1) and (2) of
Hague-Visby set forth the carrier's responsibilities. They
include the use of due diligence to provide a seaworthy
ship and, among other primary requirements, to man,
equip, and supply the ship.
Under Hamburg Article 5(1), the carrier's liability for
loss, damage, or delay cannot be avoided unless the car-
rier proves that it "took all measures that could reason-
ably be required to avoid the occurrence and its
consequences." Under original Warsaw Article 18(1) and
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Article 19, the carrier is absolutely liable for loss, damage,
or delay of goods if the occurrence which causes the dam-
age takes place during air transport or other times while
the carrier is in charge of the goods. Similar to Hamburg,
under Article 20(1) of original Warsaw, the carrier can
avoid liability if it proves that all necessary measures have
been taken to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
to take such measures.
An interesting change worked by the Hague Protocol is
the deletion of Article 20(2) from the Warsaw Conven-
tion. One of the few similar provisions between the
Hague Rules and Warsaw is the liability defenses. Under
Article 20(2), carriers are absolved from liability for dam-
ages caused by errors in piloting, handling of the aircraft,
and navigation. The Hague Rules provide a similar de-
fense for the "act, neglect, or default of the master, mari-
ner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation
or in the management of the ship." 44 It should be noted
that the Hamburg Rules also do away with this defense.45
Another area of comparison is the so-called "wilful mis-
conduct" provision. Article 8(1) of the Hamburg Rules
provides for the forfeiture of liability limitation if the loss
resulted from an act or omission of the carrier done with
intent to cause such loss, damage, or delay, or recklessly
and with knowledge that loss would result. However, the
origin of this provision is not the Warsaw Convention but
rather the Athens Passenger Convention discussed by
Professor Sweeney.46
The amount and method of calculation of limitation
also has changed from gold francs to SDR's in both the
maritime and aviation treaties. This doesn't solve the
problem insofar as low limits are concerned, but it is an
improvement. Another built-in mechanism of the new
treaties is a provision for a conference to review the limits.
I will not go into the details, but in short it requires a cer-
44 See supra note 32.
45 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
46 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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tain number of high contracting parties to request or in-
voke it. There also is a mechanism of indexing, awkward
as it is, to change the limits of liability.
Insofar as the Poincar6 franc is concerned, in Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.47 the United States
Supreme Court, if it had been so inclined, could have
wiped out the Warsaw Convention by ruling that the value
of gold should be interpreted at current rates. This might
have solved some of Mr. Kreindler's problems. Not all of
them, perhaps, but it certainly would have made the limit
so high that it would have avoided some litigation. The
Court, however, did not so hold. Instead, it used the last
Civil Aeronautics Board determination of the value of
gold, which was substantially below current market rates.
So SDR's are proposed both in Hamburg and in Montreal
3 and 4. However, the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw
Convention did not change that. The Protocol simply
doubled the amount. Nonetheless, the wilful misconduct
provision of Article 25 is replaced by much stronger lan-
guage. As we were chatting before this meeting, Profes-
sor Sweeney referred to it as the unbreakable clause and I
think that is generally what the Hague interpretations
have been so far. A carrier would have to have a pilot
deliberately fly an airplane into the ground or into a
mountain for Article 25 to remove liability limits.
JURISDICTION
In the area ofjurisdiction there are two considerations:
subject matter jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction. The
Warsaw Convention, and this is relatively unchanged in
Montreal 3 and 4, provides for four judicial jurisdictions:
1) the place where the ticket was purchased, if the carrier
has an agent or office there (this one is a little murky); 2)
the place of incorporation or principal place of the busi-
ness; 3) the domicile of the business; and, 4) the destina-
tion as shown on the ticket. The Hamburg Rules, on the
47 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
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other hand, allow a fifth jurisdiction and that jurisdiction
is the place which is agreed to by the parties in the bill of
lading. Professor Sweeney pointed out, I believe I am
correct, that we started with just that one and then they
added the four that are in Warsaw.
There is one part of Warsaw that I find disturbing and I
will take just a moment to comment on it.
There is a second part of Article 28 that provides that
the domestic or internal aspects are to be determined by
the forum. We had a case about ten years ago involving a
Pan American plane going into New Orleans that
crashed.4 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that in spite
of the fact that the Warsaw Convention applied to the
transportation, the crash was in the United States (along
with any negligent conduct), and the domicile and princi-
pal place of business of the carrier was in the United
States, the case could be bifurcated. As a result, the court
permitted Pan American to plead full liability and, after
doing so, invoke forum non conveniens to deny jurisdiction
to the plaintiffs to have the damages flowing from its lia-
bility determined in the United States, in spite of the lan-
guage in Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention that
specifically gives the plaintiff the option of that
jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit came to its conclusion that jurisdiction
questions are domestic issues under the Warsaw Conven-
tion by relying on Article 28(2) of the treaty, and cited for
support Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.49 It should be noted,
however, that neither Piper nor the earlier seminal case of
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 50 involved a treaty obligation of the
United States. Moreover, Piper involved an aircraft crash
in Scotland in which all of the victims were citizens and
residents of Scotland, the aircraft was registered in Great
Britain, the companies that owned and operated the plane
48 See In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, Louisiana onJuly 9, 1982, 821
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
49 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
50 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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were organized in the United Kingdom, the pilot and all
of the decedents' heirs and next of kin were Scottish sub-
jects, and the investigation of the mishap was conducted
by the British authorities. In light of these differences, it
is to be hoped that this will be an area of further study and
judicial review.
There are some other aspects of similarity. I think in
the area of jurisdiction one of the things that is important
is to distinguish between what I have referred to as sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction.5' In
terms of subject matter jurisdiction, there are substantial
differences between the Hamburg Rules and Warsaw.
Warsaw is very rigid on this. It is controlled entirely by
the ticket. The point of origin and destination must be in
different high contracting parties, although if one has the
same high contracting party and agreed in the ticket inter-
national stopping place, one also would have Warsaw sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The jurisdictional aspects are not
changed in terms of either the Hague Protocol or in terms
of the Montreal Protocols. For Hague to be invoked, both
the point of origin and point of destination on the ticket,
if it is international, would have to be participants in
Hague.
For the foregoing reasons, an article-by-article compari-
son of the Hamburg Rules, or even Hague-Visby, with the
Warsaw Convention is, in my judgment, neither worth-
while nor productive for either the practitioner or the aca-
demician. However, a conceptual exploration of the
topics of limitation of liability and jurisdiction in private
international law, drawing upon both maritime and avia-
tion law, should prove to be a stimulating and thought-
provoking exercise in jurisprudence.
I see that I am about out of time. Therefore, in summa-
tion, allow me to say that it has been a pleasure to appear
before you. Thank you very much.
51 See Carl E.B. McKenry, Jr., Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29
J. AIR L. & COM. 205 (1963).
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PROFESSOR JARVIS: Thank you, Professor McKenry. We
are now going to open the floor for questions. Before we
do so, however, I would like to thank all of the panelists. I
thought those were three excellent presentations.
PROFESSOR SPEEDY RICE (Gonzaga University): Have
any studies been conducted to determine what impact the
Japanese initiative has had on insurance?
MR. KREINDLER: The answer, Professor Rice, is yes,
there have been studies. I heard of a report four or five
years ago by John Brennan, who was then the Chairman
of the Board of United States Aviation Underwriters. Mr.
Brennan made a number of speeches in which he argued
that there would be no substantial difference in the cost of
insurance to abandon the limit completely. The incidence
of accidents is so small and the field of potential exposure
so large that it cancels itself out. In fact, factors other
than accident experience play an important role in the fix-
ing of rates. For example, the cost of reinsurance premi-
ums is a more effective determinant of the insurance
costs. As to formal studies, such as Rand studies and so
forth, I do not know of any, but there are in the literature
a good many references. It has been suggested that if the
rates go up perhaps the limitations would begin to have
an effect on insurance cost, but the rates so far have not
gone up, and right now, I know that it is not costing JAL
any more money for its insurance on an unlimited basis.
PROFESSOR STEVEN R. SWANSON (Hamline University):
Following up on Professor Rice's question, would not
widespread adoption of the Japanese initiative create in-
centives for carriers and insurers to thoroughly investi-
gate crashes so as to avoid them - and unlimited liability
- in the future?
MR. KREINDLER: I do not think it would, except in the
sense that having undertaken the obligation to make a
complete payment they would have about the same incen-
tive as they have now to focus on other potential
tortfeasors, such as the government and the manufactur-
ers. That, of course, exists now. I do not have that much
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faith in the motivation of insurers to do the kind of dig-
ging into the facts of these disasters that we do on the
plaintiff's side. I have never seen anything comparable. It
gets to be a philosophical question. Plaintiffs' lawyers, as
you know, work on a contingent fee and there is a lot of
built-in motivation in our system for getting to the bottom
of things. I do not think you have anything exactly the
same on the industry side.
PROFESSOR JARVIS: Professor Sweeney, did you want to
comment on the impact of insurance in the investigation
and possible prevention of maritime casualties?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY: Just a brief word. Those inter-
ested in this question should consult an article written by
Professor Michael Sturley.5 2 He has examined the insur-
ance question in the maritime field at great length. Effec-
tively, the insurance argument is going nowhere. There is
just not enough data available to determine whether a
shift from COGSA to the Hamburg Rules would have any
effect on insurance costs.
PROFESSOR GLENN H. REYNOLDS (University of Tennes-
see): Are the same insurance issues that have been de-
bated in maritime and aviation law applicable to outer
space law?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY: Well, the infant industry concept
never really applied in American maritime statutory provi-
sions, so it is something that is foreign to the maritime
field.
MR. KREINDLER: I have a little problem accepting any-
one involved in the space industry as an infant of any
kind, industry or otherwise. I agree with Professor Swee-
ney that the infant industry rationalization was nonsense.
From its infancy this baby has grown into full size and full
health. I guess I go back to a more simplistic approach.
To start with, when you are talking about damages, you
are talking about someone who has been injured, or
52 See Michael F. Sturley, Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting
Empirical Arguments About Hague, Visby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum of Empirical Evidence,
24J. MAR. L. &Com. 119 (1993).
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someone who has been killed. You are basically consider-
ing, on the one side, an innocent victim of an accident,
and on the other side the tortfeasor who was in control of
the operation and certainly had more of an opportunity to
prevent errors in the first place. Society must not forget
that.
When you talk about limitations, the concept of limita-
tion itself implies a limited amount. Whether it is $500 or
$2 billion, it does not make any difference what the
amount is. If there is a limitation, and it is to be effective,
it means that it is less than the damages actually were. So
starting with the fact that we are dealing with innocent vic-
tims and then considering limitation as something which
necessarily imposes on the innocent victims a recovery
that is less than the damages they have actually sustained,
the answer to me is very simple. I just think that limita-
tions are wrong. They are not reflective of the realities of
the situation and the needs of society.
PROFESSOR MCKENRY: First of all, at least at the pres-
ent, most issues of liability are going to come about in
terms of property damage. That will change in time with
more space travel by humans. It is a little complicated be-
cause of the fact that, with the exception of some of the
commercial satellites, most of these matters raise issues of
sovereign immunity. It seems to me that if there is an in-
fant industry, by definition, you are balancing the risk, the
burden of proof, and the responsibility of the defendant
against the recovery and the magnitude of the recovery.
The whole idea is basically that, in effect, we will make it
easier to recover, but we are going to put a limit on the
amount you can recover. The problem is that when that
industry is no longer an infant industry you have a very
difficult time of removing the limits. The Warsaw Con-
vention is a good illustration of that. It is difficult to re-
move the infant industry protection because by then the
industry is so strong that it is going to lobby to keep it, so
this is the problem I see in the infant industry situation in
regard to space.
[59
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PROFESSOR JARVIS: Professor McKenry's last point, that
it is difficult to remove infant industry protection once the
industry grows up, is a good one. The Shipowners' Limi-
tation of Liability Act5 3 was passed in 1851 to encourage
the development of the American merchant marine.
Although the Act is no longer needed, it remains in place
because of the very strong lobbying efforts of the shipping
industry.
PROFESSOR GREGORY C. SISK (Drake University): I see
that the Hamburg Rules are written in several different
languages. The Warsaw Convention was drafted in
French, which is the only authentic and authoritative text.
Professor McKenry referred to the problem of translation
with respect to international agreements. The problem
goes even deeper than that. With respect to the Warsaw
Convention, American courts have looked beyond the
French text to French law as a guide for the meaning of
the treaty. The most significant example of this occurred
in the case of Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,54 which raised
the question of whether damages for emotional distress
are recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
decided this question after taking a lengthy tour through
French law and concluding that recovery for mental injury
would be permitted under French law. 55 This decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that
French law failed to shed any light on this issue and that
the text of the Convention, read literally, required a phys-
ical injury to obtain recovery.
My own view, as argued in an article I have written,5 6 is
that an inquiry into one nation's law because an interna-
tional agreement is written in that nation's language is
misguided. This should be an exercise in treaty interpre-
53 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-189 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
54 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
55 872 F.2d 1462 (llth Cir. 1989).
56 See Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention:
The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lision Corporelle, 25 TEx. INT'L LJ.
127 (1990).
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tation, not comparative law. I would be interested in the
panel's thoughts on this problem in general, and in partic-
ular in Professor Sweeney's thoughts on whether drafting
a text in multiple languages would avoid the problem of
looking to domestic law to interpret international
agreements.
PROFESSOR McKENRY: I think that first of all you have,
as I called it, two layers, which is the initial problem. One,
as you pointed out, being the translation from one lan-
guage to another, and the second one being the interpre-
tation behind that language. The United Kingdom made
Warsaw effective through its own language, which re-
moved at least one of those problems. That is not always
going to happen but as I mentioned the British are pretty
good at that and it would seem to me that the European
Community, or now the European Union, might give you
a little laboratory in that regard because you have two sys-
tems, the Irish and the British on their common law base,
and the others on a civil law base.
PROFESSOR SWEENEY: The Hamburg Rules were drafted
only in English. All of the Working Group's formal ses-
sions were, as is customary in the United Nations, done in
all of the official languages, so that the formal sessions
were always in English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chi-
nese, and Arabic, but the actual drafting sessions were
only in English. When the substantive work was com-
pleted after seven years, the language experts from the
United Nations' headquarters in New York came to
Hamburg to try and resolve into each of the linguistic spe-
cialties the various translation problems. I must say I
have no idea what the Arabic and Chinese texts say, but I
look at the amount of space given for the various provi-
sions in the other languages and I think we are creating
work for our students, the future lawyers of the world,
and I do not think that I should take the bread out of their
mouths. There are bound to be arguments about differ-
ent shades of meaning in the six official language texts
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because all texts are equally authentic. Just let me give
you an example.
The text in English, Russian, and Spanish for, let us say,
Article 12, might be two inches long, and all of a sudden
you look at the French text and it is three inches long. I
do understand why, but it is very hard when you are trying
to compare texts to see why there should be far more
words to put the same thought into the French language
than it takes to put it into Spanish or English. Just a fur-
ther word about international law. The International
Court of Justice and the Vienna Convention on Treaties
have a technique of harmonization of equally authentic
texts that I think will have to be used in the future as we
deal with these problems. Right now, no cases have come
up and there have not yet been problems, but I predict
there will be lots of problems in the future.
MR. KREINDLER: My approach, of course, is from the
standpoint of an advocate. As you may recall, in the first
Lockerbie case, 57 the one involving whether you could re-
cover punitive damages under the Warsaw Convention,
Judge Cardamone manufactured a brand new concept for
us. He said we had to look to federal common law for
standards of damages under the Warsaw Convention. 58
He did not, of course, bother to go on and tell us what
federal common law is, or whether under federal common
law we can recover loss of society. On that precise ques-
tion, we have references, as you might guess, to French
law, French precedents, and so forth. I think that maybe
the advocate is not so far away from the students you were
talking about, Professor Sweeney, because I kind of think
that as a practical matter when you get to the question of
advocacy, the advocate is likely to seize upon each and
every basis for treaty interpretation he or she can think of,
no matter what. No one has told us, and no one has told
the courts, exactly which of the many standards of treaty
51 See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
.1 Id. at 1270.
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interpretation should be applied. The answer is that they
all get discussed anyway, and there might be a slight bal-
ancing because the treaty is drawn in multiple languages,
but all of the arguments are going to be made anyway.
PROFESSOR PETER WINSHIP (Southern Methodist Uni-
versity): I would like to add that one way to encourage
uniform interpretation is to disseminate, as widely as pos-
sible, relevant opinions of courts and arbitral tribunals.
As Professor Sweeney knows, UNCITRAL has undertaken
to collect national court decisions and arbitral awards that
construe UNCITRAL texts such as the Hamburg Rules.
To do this, UNCITRAL has set up a system known as
"CLOUT" (Case Law On UNCITRAL Texts). It has in-
vited states to appoint "national correspondents" to col-
lect relevant decisions and awards rendered in their
jurisdictions and send them to UNCITRAL's Secretariat
in Vienna with a brief digest. The Secretariat acts as a
clearinghouse, periodically publishing the digests and
making individual opinions available on request. If any-
one is interested in CLOUT, I would be happy to supply
further information after the session.59
PROFESSOR GEORGE K. WALKER (Wake Forest Univer-
sity): What effect will the demise of the Soviet Union have
on these matters?
PROFESSOR McKENRY: I think that we need to watch the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)60 very closely. I
watch each case to see how far they are willing to go in
arguing that a state-owned carrier is eligible for some type
of special treatment and, as you know, generally speaking,
if it is a pure commercial operation, it is not a problem.
But I would just add that I think that there is a little mis-
chief, one way or another, in interpreting the FSIA. In the
most recent aviation cases, the United States courts will
take jurisdiction if the organization is a commercial un-
19 Editor's Note: Professor Winship currently serves as one of the United States'
two national correspondents. The other correspondent is ProfessorJohn 0. Hon-
nold of the University of Pennsylvania.
60 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
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dertaking and there is some business activity in the United
States. However, the fact that an enterprise is commercial
in nature will not keep the FSIA from applying if a sover-
eign government is whole or part owner, and there is still
removal to the federal district court and a non-jury trial as
a rule. It is also interesting to note that the choice of law
issue has been distinguished from and treated differently
in FSIA cases than in Federal Tort Claims Act6 ' cases,
although the language is similar.
While I have the microphone, I would like to ask Pro-
fessor Sweeney to comment on Hamburg's Annex on
Common Understanding and what effect, if any, it has had
on Articles 5, 6, and 8.
PROFESSOR SWEENEY: The early discussions in 1972 had
reviewed the bases of liability that were possible, and
early on it was decided to retain the fault basis and reject
strict liability. At the conclusion of the Diplomatic Con-
ference it was thought that since the language of Article 5
did not really spell out that it was a fault system, that it
would be wise to say so somewhere. We could not find a
convenient place to put it into the text of the treaty and,
as a result, the so-called Common Understanding Annex
was crafted. The Annex makes it clear that Hamburg im-
poses a reverse burden of proof.
The negotiations over Articles 5, 6, and 8 were ex-
tremely complex and lengthy. Articles 5, 6, and 8 were all
negotiated together. It was a package deal and that is the
reason that we can speak of a fault system of liability, a
fault system that is limited in amount but possibly
breakable.
In the final dealmaking, delegates were able to stress
those affirmative positions that they felt essential while
possibly losing those negative positions they desired but
did not regard as essential. Thus, the instructions of our
government insisted on a unit of limitation of liability that
would cover the maximum amount of our trade by weight.
61 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
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As it happened, 2§ SDR's covered 98.5% of our exports
and 99.4% of our imports. The United States preferred
that the limits be breakable, but we could not have both.
In similar fashion, European shipowners represented by
the Netherlands insisted that the unit limitation be un-
breakable. They also preferred to retain the negligent
navigation defense unchanged, but they could not have
both. The fire provision - Article 5(4) - reeks of com-
promise, and that is an unfortunate legacy to future
lawyers.
PROFESSOR JARVIS: Unfortunately, I see that our time
has come to an end. On behalf of both Professor Straubel
and myself and our respective sections, we thank you for
attending this morning's session and we are especially
grateful to our panelists for their insightful and thought-
ful comments.
Comments

